



THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO
REPORT TO THE CITY COUNCIL

DATE ISSUED: October 13, 2010 REPORT NO:
ATTENTION: Public Safety and Neighborhood Services Committee
SUBJECT: Engine Company Brownout and Lifeguard Reductions Monthly Report
REFERENCE: None

REQUESTED ACTION

This is an informational item only. No action is required by the Committee or the City Council.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

Accept the Report.

INTRODUCTION

This is the eighth report to the PS&NS Committee on the status of the Engine Company brownouts and Lifeguard reductions being administered to achieve budgetary savings in the Fire-Rescue Department. Brownouts are defined as the temporary closures of up to eight fire engines per day in those fire stations housing more than one emergency response apparatus.

This month's report will update workload, brownout frequency, and response time statistics since the inception of the Brownout Plan on February 6, 2010 through October 6, 2010. It will also address an increase in overdue fire company inspections and reduction in training opportunities since the plan began. Impacts to Lifeguard operations resulting from staffing reductions will also be discussed. Lastly, proposed FY2012 budget reductions and their anticipated impacts will be presented.

SUMMARY

During this reporting period (February 6 to October 6, 2010), the thirteen engines subject to brownout were out-of-service from 33% to 99% of the time. As a result, compliance with the 5 minute 90% of the time national response standard for the first due unit has declined to 24% to 80% within these districts and 54% city-wide. This compares with 26% to 86% in these districts and 55% city-wide for the same period last year. Average response times have increased by 0 to 28 seconds within these districts and by 5 seconds city-wide when compared to the same period last year.

Response times for the assembly of an Effective Fire Force of 14-15 firefighters (3 engines, 1 truck and 1 battalion chief) within the 9 minutes 90% of the time national response standard was 0% to 100% within

these districts and 71% city-wide. This compares with 40% to 100% and 70% city-wide for the same period last year. Average response times for the assembly of an Effective Fire Force decreased slightly (less than one minute) within these districts and city-wide when compared to the same period last year.

STATISTICAL DATA

Following is cumulative statistical data for the emergency response districts subject to fire engine brownouts and the response time impacts city-wide for the period indicated.

Brownout Frequency

Data in the table below reflects the percentage of total operational hours in the reporting period (days in period x 24 hours) that the indicated engine company was out-of-service due to placement in brownout status.

Percent of Time Units Browned Out 02/06/2010 – 10/06/2010

Community	Engine	Pct.
College	E10	90%
Downtown	E201	48%
East Village	E4	34%
Golden Hills	E11	50%
Kearny Mesa	E28	46%
Lincoln Park	E12	33%
Midway	E20	54%
Mira Mesa	E44	99%
North Park	E14	54%
Pacific Beach	E21	47%
Rancho Penasquitos	E40	99%
San Ysidro	E29	46%
University City	E35	37%

Number of Emergency Responses

Data in the table below reflects the total number and type of emergency incidents that occurred within the City during the reporting period.

Overall System Wide 02/06 - 10/06/2010

	Fire	Medical	Other	Total
2009	2,437	64,481	8,988	75,906
2010	2,342	66,672	8,207	77,221
Percent Change	-3.90	3.40	-8.69	1.73

City-wide Response Time Performance

This following data reflects City-wide response time performance expressed in two formats. The first table shows the percentage of incidents where no more than 5 minutes elapsed from the time an engine or truck company was notified of an emergency response and their arrival at the scene of the emergency. The nationally accepted standard is 90% and the Department's current performance target is 55%. The second table uses the same notification and arrival time stamps, but reports response times as an average (mean). It is important to note that expressing these values as an average can obscure substandard performance in some communities.

5 Minutes or Less Response Time Percentage (1st Arriving Engine or Truck)

2009 Pct	2010 Pct	Percent Change
55.12%	53.83%	-2.33

Average Response Time (1st Arriving Engine or Truck)

2009 Avg	2010 Avg	Percent Change
0:05:03	0:05:08	1.46

Data Reported by Brownout Community

The data in the following tables uses the same criteria as described above, but breaks the data down by individual community.

Browned Out Districts Incident Counts 02/06 – 10/06/2010

	2009			2010			Percent Change		
	Fire	Medical	Other	Fire	Medical	Other	Fire	Medical	Other
College (Sta. 10)	64	1,688	198	51	1,770	181	-20.31	4.86	-8.59
Downtown (Sta. 201)	40	1,467	277	49	1,484	258	22.50	1.16	-6.86
East Village (Sta. 4)	53	2,699	349	64	2,978	285	20.75	10.34	-18.34
Golden Hills (Sta. 11)	64	1,379	145	62	1,372	114	-3.13	-0.51	-21.38
Kearny Mesa (Sta. 28)	80	1,596	435	83	1,675	356	3.75	4.95	-18.16
Lincoln Park (Sta. 12)	128	3,062	260	125	3,026	196	-2.34	-1.18	-24.62
Midway (Sta. 20)	49	2,082	278	62	2,235	241	26.53	7.35	-13.31
Mira Mesa (Sta. 44)	50	1,067	200	38	975	184	-24.00	-8.62	-8.00
North Park (Sta. 14)	84	1,923	185	71	2,058	174	-15.48	7.02	-5.95
Pacific Beach (Sta. 21)	58	2,158	285	56	2,273	289	-3.45	5.33	1.40
Rancho Penasquitos (Sta. 40)	32	824	119	30	815	108	-6.25	-1.09	-9.24
San Ysidro (Sta. 29)	42	2,265	123	62	2,441	94	47.62	7.77	-23.58
University City (Sta. 35)	108	1,967	609	98	2,045	614	-9.26	3.97	0.82

5 Minutes or Less Response Time Percentage (First Arriving Engine or Truck)		2009 Pct	2010 Pct	Pct Change
College (Sta. 10)	10	53.81%	45.60%	-15.26
Downtown (Sta. 201)	201	80.18%	80.25%	0.08
East Village (Sta. 4)	04	86.31%	80.07%	-7.23
Golden Hills (Sta. 11)	11	73.69%	66.61%	-9.60
Kearny Mesa (Sta. 28)	28	37.65%	35.79%	-4.92
Lincoln Park (Sta. 12)	12	49.26%	46.07%	-6.48
Midway (Sta. 20)	20	51.73%	49.34%	-4.62
Mira Mesa (Sta. 44)	44	39.58%	32.97%	-16.70
North Park (Sta. 14)	14	76.47%	68.07%	-10.99
Pacific Beach (Sta. 21)	21	60.21%	49.81%	-17.28
Rancho Penasquitos (Sta. 40)	40	26.46%	24.12%	-8.83
San Ysidro (Sta. 29)	29	59.58%	57.10%	-4.16
University City (Sta. 35)	35	33.20%	28.54%	-14.04

Average Response Time (First Arriving Engine or Truck)		2009 Avg	2010 Avg	Pct Change
College (Sta. 10)	10	0:05:03	0:05:19	5.10
Downtown (Sta. 201)	201	0:03:50	0:03:49	-0.48
East Village (Sta. 4)	04	0:03:48	0:04:03	6.35
Golden Hills (Sta. 11)	11	0:04:14	0:04:32	7.05
Kearny Mesa (Sta. 28)	28	0:05:44	0:05:53	2.63
Lincoln Park (Sta. 12)	12	0:05:11	0:05:21	3.18
Midway (Sta. 20)	20	0:05:09	0:05:22	3.92
Mira Mesa (Sta. 44)	44	0:05:48	0:06:08	5.74
North Park (Sta. 14)	14	0:04:06	0:04:30	9.77
Pacific Beach (Sta. 21)	21	0:04:43	0:05:11	10.02
Rancho Penasquitos (Sta. 40)	40	0:06:17	0:06:38	5.68
San Ysidro (Sta. 29)	29	0:04:58	0:05:09	3.61
University City (Sta. 35)	35	0:06:15	0:06:30	3.97

Effective Fire Force

The following data reflects response time performance for the assembly of the 14-15 firefighters needed to complete the tasks necessary to combat a typical residential structure fire. In our City, this is achieved by the response of 3 engines, 1 truck, and 1 battalion chief. The table shows both City-wide and brownout district performance. The nationally accepted standard is 90% and the Department's current performance target is 72%.

Effective Fire Force*

02/06 - 10/06/2010

		2009	2009	2009	2010	2010	2010
Community	Engine	Percent 9 Min	Average (Minutes)	Count	Percent 9 Min	Average (Minutes)	Count
College	10	85.71%	7.96	14	66.67%	8.08	12
Downtown	201	92.31%	8.69	13	91.67%	5.25	12
East Village	04	100.00%	4.48	25	80.95%	5.53	21
Golden Hills	11	100.00%	5.76	13	100.00%	6.34	18
Kearny Mesa	28	40.00%	9.24	5	87.50%	7.83	16
Lincoln Park	12	77.78%	7.35	18	78.26%	7.71	23
Midway	20	50.00%	8.53	6	80.00%	8.08	10
Mira Mesa	44	40.00%	9.02	5	0.00%	11.68	6
North Park	14	100.00%	6.23	19	100.00%	6.50	16
Pacific Beach	21	54.55%	8.76	11	57.14%	8.99	7
RanchoPenasquitos	40	66.67%	8.89	3	0.00%	11.38	5
San Ysidro	29	60.00%	9.24	5	80.00%	7.65	5
University City	35	38.89%	10.35	18	54.17%	9.08	24
City Wide		69.83%	8.19	421	70.67%	8.08	416

* 29 incidents originally dispatched as single engine responses and later upgraded were not included in this EFF calculation

SERVICE DELIVERY IMPACTS

There is ample scientific data to support that the more quickly the right type and number of resources can be brought to bear on an emergency incident, generally speaking, the better the outcome. Under the best of circumstances, multiple concurrent calls for service, routine maintenance, training, community educational outreach events, administrative activities, and unit location at the time of an incident dispatch can all impact incident response times.

Because many variables can influence incident outcomes, it is very difficult to isolate changes in incident outcomes resulting solely from brownouts. However, it can be safely assumed that any emergency receiving a delayed response for any reason will result in undesired impacts. In the case of fires, the most likely impact is increased fire spread and damage and the increased possibility of injury or death. In the case of a medical emergency, the impact may be prolonged pain from an injury, distress from a medical condition, or greater risk of permanent injury or death.

Service delivery impacts are felt by all requestors for emergency response whenever a response is delayed due to brownouts or other reasons. However, accurately isolating the specific impacts of the brownouts on victim survival probability proves to be extremely difficult and it is important to note that over the past five years an average of four persons per year have died as a result of fires in our City.

Non-emergency impacts include a noticeable increase in the number of fire inspections performed by our engine and truck companies that are late in being completed and increased difficulty in conducting manipulative training due to the number of units committed to incidents or out-of-service status.

To address the late inspections impacts, light duty personnel have been assigned to assist in completing these assignments when they are available. In April of this year, 12% of the inspections performed by companies were more than 90 days overdue. Currently, 20% are overdue. These overdue inspections increase risk associated with not identifying and correcting fire code violations and slow the collection of inspection fee revenues.

To address the challenges in freeing units from emergency response status to conduct required training, the number of units permitted to be temporarily out-of-service at one time was recently increased from 12 to 14. In addition, the number of units removed from service to attend manipulative training sessions for 4 hours in the morning and afternoon at the Regional Public Safety Training Institute has been reduced from 5 (or 4) to 3 (or 2) units. When possible, these training sessions have been reduced by sending an instructor to the fire station or delivering the training in an online format to increase unit availability.

Ripple Effect of Brownouts on Emergency Response System

When an emergency response unit is unavailable for response for any reason, including brownouts, another unit must be sent to the incident. When there are multiple concurrent incidents (a common occurrence), a ripple effect occurs that can impact several communities as units move throughout the City to provide the best coverage possible. While the Brownout Plan exacerbates this situation, these types of response delays occurred before the Plan was implemented and are aggravated by the fact that the City has less than the optimal number of fire stations and crews needed to serve our communities.

Significant Emergency Response Impacts during this Reporting Period

On October 6, 2010, at 1417 hours a residential structure fire was reported at 8708 Aquarius Drive, in the community of Mira Mesa. The fire originated in the garage, and before it was extinguished had penetrated the attic of the dwelling, causing approximately \$500,000 in damage. There were no injuries. The fire was the result of a malfunction in a clothes dryer.

Response Time Analysis

Truck 44 was the closest resource and arrived in 8 minutes, 19 seconds.; 3 minutes 19 seconds longer than our goal of 5 minutes. Marine Corps Engine 60 was the first apparatus to arrive with extinguishment capability, and their response time was 9 minutes, 29 seconds. An Effective Fire Force was assembled at this incident in 10 minutes, 36 seconds; 1 minute 36 seconds longer than our goal of 9 minutes.

Engine Availability Analysis

Engine 38, the first due engine for this address, was engaged in treating a priority medical emergency that had walked into their fire station, and was not available for this response. Engine 44 was the second due engine, but was browned out. Marine Corps Engine 60 was the third due engine and the first engine to arrive at the incident.

Conclusions

Engine 38 was not available due to a medical aid incident, and this situation has and will continue to occur with or without brownouts. The brownout of Engine 44 did materially delay the arrival of water to this incident. Had extinguishment capability been available earlier, it would have halted the fire's progression and reduced the amount of damage that occurred.

Status of Adjustments Made to Mitigate Brownout Plan Response Time Impacts

No adjustments to improve response times are possible without shifting impacts to busier units or re-staffing browned out units. Re-staffing of browned out units can only be accomplished by the allocation of additional revenues to offset the anticipated budgetary savings that would be lost.

Projected/Actual Savings

Savings targeted to be realized during the last half of FY 2010 were projected to be \$4.2 million dollars. The program began on February 6, 2010 following the completion of implementation negotiations with Local 145. The savings that are directly attributable to the brownouts for this period are \$4,174,806.

Savings of \$11.5 million are to be realized in FY 2011. A system has been developed within our personnel scheduling program that will allow for the more accurate real-time tracking of savings generated during this period and comparisons to data from Financial Management, when available.

It is worthwhile to note that the savings are driven by the actual vacancy rates that occur within the Department. We have achieved the brownout of eight engines most days during the reporting period, but not every day. The difference in the amount will be small, but there will be a difference between projected and actual savings at the end of the fiscal year.

LIFEGUARD DIVISION

The Lifeguard Division contributed to budgetary savings via a number of reductions. Impacts from reductions taken have been felt in several areas of lifeguard operations: lifeguard coverage, training activities, increased workloads for supervisors, personnel schedules and Reductions in Force (RIF). These impacts are discussed below.

Budget Reduction Impacts on Lifeguard Training

To achieve budgetary savings for Fiscal Years 2010-2011, dedicated training on Wednesdays was eliminated and employee schedules were altered to create additional relief shifts. These relief shifts allow the Lifeguard Division to cover open operational shifts on straight time rather than with overtime. Additionally, the River Rescue Team had its annual training reduced by half. Both of these changes resulted in a reduction in the overtime budget. The Lifeguard Division also eliminated one Lifeguard II position dedicated to developing, organizing, and conducting training. Budgetary savings achieved by these reductions are \$236,000 in overtime and \$68,912 for the LGII FTE.

While these reductions have decreased training opportunities overall, and are a negative impact, minimal critical training required for employees to maintain essential skills is being attempted through in-service training, as well as a series of modules offered at the start of employee shifts. A training plan has been

developed and was implemented beginning October 2, 2010. This plan will continue to be evaluated and revised throughout the winter months.

Reduction in Force (RIF) and Utilization of Out-of-Class (OCA) Assignments

Eight full time equivalent (FTE) positions were eliminated from the Lifeguard Division budget. Four of these positions were unfilled at the time of the budget reductions, including a Marine Safety Lieutenant and a Lifeguard Sergeant. Administrative assignments for these two positions were shifted to other supervisors; most notably Division-wide scheduling and other operational and personnel support. Additionally, four of the positions were filled. The four impacted employees were demoted as a result of the RIF and returned to open positions in the classification of Lifeguard I. Lifeguard I is an hourly position with no benefits. The Lifeguard Division has traditionally employed approximately 200 Lifeguards I.

The four positions associated with the RIF represent a budgetary savings of approximately \$256,476. As a result of negotiating RIF impacts with Teamsters, it was agreed that the four employees impacted by RIF would receive priority for filling out-of-class (OCA) assignments as Lifeguards II for temporarily unfilled positions caused by reasons such as sickness or long term injury. One of the employees has been re-hired as a Lifeguard II, filling behind a retirement that occurred within the Division. Two more have been re-hired as Lifeguard II's, in limited positions with benefits behind one long-term injury and one on a leave of absence.

Lifeguard Division Update on Torrey Pines Incidents

Following Labor Day, staffing was eliminated and responses now come from lifeguards assigned to La Jolla Shores or other districts.

The following incidents have been recorded for Torrey Pines City Beach:

2010 Torrey Pines City Beach Responses 09/16/2010 to 10/06/2010	Total
Medical Aids (via 911 or Call Box)	4
Water Rescues	1
Cliff Rescues/Recoveries	0
Preventative Actions (cliff & water warnings/non-rescue calls)	27
Enforcement	1
Other Calls for Service	1
Total Incidents	34

The following incidents have been recorded for the non-City sections of Torrey Pines Beach:

2010 Torrey Pines Beach Response (non-City sections) 09/16/2010 to 10/06/2010	Total
Medical Aids (via 911 or Call Box)	4
Water Rescues	0

Cliff Rescues/Recoveries	0
Preventative Actions (cliff & water warnings/non-rescue calls)	15
Enforcement	1
Other Calls for Service	1
Total Incidents	21

Lifeguard Division Update on Wind'n'Sea Beach

The PS&NS report presented on September 22, 2010 was the final report to outline beach activity with reduced staffing. Following Labor Day, staffing consisted of seasonal lifeguards working on weekends through September. This is the historic staffing plan which was in place prior to the midyear budget reductions which began on January 1, 2010.

Additional Budget Reductions Proposed for FY2012

In a memo dated September 13, 2010, Chief Operating Officer Jay Goldstone instructed Department Directors to prepare a plan for budget reductions to address the City's \$72 million budget shortfall projected for FY 2012. The Fire-Rescue Department's budget reduction target was set at approximately \$7.2 million.

Multiple rounds of reductions have impacted our Department in the past several years and every area of our operations has been touched in some way. In considering all that has been done so far, and our remaining resources, I have concluded that the only realistic way to meet the FY 2012 reduction target is to make further reductions in our fire and lifeguard operations divisions. Consequently, I have submitted the following recommendations for reductions to the Mayor:

Helicopter Program

- Eliminate staffing for the 2nd helicopter placed in service for six months of the year
- Both helicopters will be retained and flight time allocated between the two ships
- (1) Pilot would be subject to lay-off
- Estimated Savings: \$1,112,000

Fire Engine and Truck Rolling Brownouts and Blackouts

- (5) additional engines/trucks would be added to the (8) currently subject to daily brownouts (temporary) and blackouts (fulltime) closure
- Single-unit fire stations will be included and subject to closures of up to one month at a time
- Up to (60) firefighter positions will be subject to lay-off based on seniority
- Demotions in ranks above firefighter will be required to achieve these lay-offs
- Estimated Savings: \$5,418,000

Lifeguard Division Reductions

- Lifeguard protection on Mission Bay beaches would be reduced and/or eliminated.
 - During Spring Break and on weekends in the spring and fall there would be no lifeguards on duty at any time.
 - During the peak summer season (mid-June thru Labor Day) there would be no lifeguard coverage at Ventura Cove, Sail Bay, Crown Point, De Anza Cove, and Tecolote Shores.

- There would be lifeguard protection at Leisure Lagoon and Bonita Cove; however, staffing would be reduced by (1) each day at each of these locations.
- Lifeguard I Tower Relief would be reduced by (1) lifeguard at each of these locations: Ocean Beach, South Mission Beach, Mission Beach, La Jolla Rocks and La Jolla Shores.
- North Pacific Beach will lose all Lifeguard II coverage year-round.
 - From the day after Labor Day thru mid-June there would be no lifeguard protection.
 - Lifeguard I coverage will continue to exist during the peak summer season, however, it will be without Lifeguard II supervision.
 - Lifeguard II positions normally assigned to this location will be reassigned to relief to backfill other operational positions when vacated by sickness, injury, training, vacation, etc. The budget savings will be realized by a reduction of overtime.
- Lifeguard Night Crew will be reduced from (4) to (2) nightly.
 - (2) Lifeguard II FTE would be eliminated. If there are no unfilled positions at the time of the budget reductions, this would likely result in (2) people being demoted from Lifeguard II to Lifeguard I.
- Estimated Savings: \$695,000

FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS

The brownouts are projected to achieve an FY2011 budgetary savings of \$11.5M. Brownout Plan savings during the last half of FY 2010 were projected to be \$4.2 million. Savings realized for this period were \$4.17 million.

The Lifeguard Division elimination of eight (8) FTE, reductions to overtime, Torrey Pines operations, Wind 'n' Sea operations and operational relief hours are projected to achieve an FY2011 budgetary savings of \$721,915. Lifeguard reductions during the last half of FY 2010 were taken as a prorated share of this amount.

If the additional reductions proposed for FY2012 are taken, the Department will reduce its overall budget by an additional \$7.2 million dollars.

PREVIOUS COUNCIL and/or COMMITTEE ACTIONS

N/A

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND PUBLIC OUTREACH EFFORTS

Ongoing

KEY STAKEHOLDERS AND PROJECTED IMPACTS

Community and Citizens



Javier Mainar, Fire Chief